Abstract This paper focuses on searching for the conditions of cooperation in collaborative technology innovation including the Government and private enterprises. After assuming the collaborative project of code division multiple access (CDMA) as one of the collective actions, attempts to analyze the case of CDMA technology development process by applying the theoretical propositions derived from two approaches, collective action and prisoner dilemma. Identifies government's roles and strategies as a third party who guarantees the realistic conditions for cooperation to induce the success of joint ventures which inherently have the potential risk of
Introduction
Traditionally, economic dynamics have depended on Classical Economy Schools who believe in the static equilibrium of economy without instability; under their assumptions, the trajectory of economic development follows after a predetermined path of economic development. But the realities have never given the confirming evidences for such arguments. The static economic model has been replaced by the dynamic one assuming that the third influential factors except for the capital and labor could lead to the economic growth. Those arguments are more addressed by Schumpeterians; the most important factor driving economy development is technology. Techno-science knowledge to reduce the cost of input factors and to reinforce the required productivity is the prerequisite for determining the country's rank of economic competitiveness in the world market. As technology innovation emerges as a key variable to determine the nation's competitiveness, the innovation and technology policies led by governments have been acknowledged as well.
There are so many strategies by which technology innovation comes into being. As collaborative R&D may well be thought as one of those strategy categories, this mode is catching up with the policy trend more than any other development tactics. Today, as every state tends to accept the mode of joint BIJ 8,3
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ventures (JVs) as a dominant strategy, even laissez faire states such as the USA and the UK have been adopting collaborative research for technology innovation [1] . But the collaborative technology innovation has some defections. First of all, as the efficiency rising from cooperation is apt to be distracted by free-riding or opportunistic problems caused by selfish motivation of collaborators, their avaricious actions frequently destroy the productive cooperation in collaborative technology innovation. This paper focuses on searching for the conditions of cooperation in collaborative technology innovations which inherently have the potential risk of cooperation collapse caused by the opportunistic or free-riding behaviors of private collaborators. We will identify government's roles and strategies as a third party who guarantees the realistic conditions for cooperation to induce the success of JVs. Finally, we could suggest the definitive and realistic conditions for cooperation, government's roles, and policy tools for the future collaborative R&D.
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contribute to the joint efforts, but to be free rider on the efforts of others (Ostrom, 1990) . We could also observe those paradoxes in the related researches about CA and PD in detail. CA theory presumes a situation of group participation, in which members of groups or organizations face two choices: being free riders or being participators. As individual could receive the dividend produced by collective action without participation and contribution, he may well have the motivation to defect from participation obligation. Indeed, unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is either coercion or other special device ± including negative or positive incentives ± to make individual acts for common interests, rational, and self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests (Olson, 1965) . Moreover free-riding problems could be aggravated by characteristics of collectively utilized goods or public products that reveal the nonexcludability and nonrivalry [3] .
Under the PD situation, two people play under already-made payoff matrix without information about other's move and choice. Under PD game, it is generally more profitable to defect at the individual level, but if two players all do so, the payoff is worse off than when all choose to cooperate. If both trust each other, they come to equilibrium maximizing the welfare of both whereas if the actors play according to distrust and selfishness, they face the least payoff to each player.
Although two approaches seem to be quite different, they have also several points in common. First of all, all the theories basically assumed that the incompatibility between individual rationality and collective choice impeded achieving the best welfare of community or all collaborators. If all players restrain the selfish opportunistic behaviors, trust each other, deliberate other's share, and participate in collective action, they will get the optimal payoff profitable to all the participators. For the equilibrium maximizing payoff and welfare for collective action, the cooperation among participators is inevitable.
The alternatives for cooperation and government as critical third party
To overcome the dilemma imposed by self-interest seekers and then achieve the cooperation satisfying all the constituents, the alternatives for resolving the disputes come from various disciplines. First, viewing from game theoretical model, for inducing mutual cooperation, Axelrod (1984) suggests three categories including:
(1) making the shadow of future more important relative to the present (durability and reciprocity); (2) changing the payoffs to the players from possible outcome of a move; and (3) teaching the players values, facts, and skills that will promote cooperation (learning by doing).
Repeated interactions within the same groups develop reciprocity, trust, and reputation. Kim (1993) suggested the following as factors to influence the results of the game: BIJ 8,3
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. the coercion;
. payoff structure and its resetting;
. the number of repeated games and the possibility of future interaction;
.
(in)direct communication; and .
information about the opposite party in the game.
Second, perspectives from CA, Olson (1965) , let alone economic incentives, the social ones motivated by a desire to win prestige, respect, friendship, and other social and psychological objective were stressed to mobilize the latent groups. The only organizations that have the selective incentives available for inducing the cooperation are those:
having the authority and capacity; or .
having a source of positive inducements that they can offer the individuals in a latent group.
These approaches have several limits. First of all, as all the theories give more stress on voluntary order organized between actors, collaborative parties could voluntarily make any consensus and contraction without intervention from the third parties. But in reality the economic actors who seek for their own interests have the possibility to face the deadlock situation, i.e. irreconcilable situation by themselves. Under those settings, the legitimacy of government intervention into the game is deserved. It doesn't, however, mean that the third party always solves all the problems. The considerate and impartial authority would take jobs such as facilitating the communication between actors, setting the whole plans and goals, forming the organized order for goal achievements, and resolving the emerging conflicts. According to Chiang (1995) , when collaborative R&D faces a very difficult task because of conflicting interests and great technological uncertainties:
. governments should concentrate their managerial support on facilitating the negotiation process by providing the protocols and thirdparty consultations; and . governments should also, if they have credibility and competence, propose collective goals and lead firms to work together under a government-designed framework. Poyago-Theotoky (1998) shows that when imitation to innovation is easy there will be generally underinvestment due to the free-rider problems. In this case, public enterprises or governments get the opposite role against private firms by taking policy measures aiming at correcting those problems of collective actions. Also, Tripsasa et al. (1995) proves that government can discourage the opportunistic behavior in collaborative R&D.
Are there any similarities between JVs and problems of CA and PD? To apply the assumptions derived from two models to collaborative technology innovation, initially, we must explicate the parallels between them. In Benchmarking government's roles
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collaborative projects, private enterprises bear the goals to maximize their profits and also they face the temptation to seek opportunistic behaviors for their own benefits because the technology benefit from collaboration naturally appears nonexclusive and inappropriate; without any contribution, free-riding imitators and opportunistic actors could get more returns than those of stick-tocooperation actors.
Government's roles for cooperation in collaborative ventures
In collaborative ventures, what kinds of conditions for cooperation could government guarantee? To answer the question, first of all, we must consider the motivation and situation in which self-interested private actors show much more opportunistic and loafing behaviors. From the related researches, we draw out two categories to stimulate the free-riding action of private enterprises:
(1) uncertainty; and (2) unacceptable payoff structure.
Government's role for cooperation should focus on two factors since they give rise to aversion motivation to collaborations. While the uncertainty has a relation with subjective conditions, the payoff structure has it with objective. First, multiple definitions of uncertainty have been offered in the literature, including lack of knowledge for decision making (Thompson, 1967) ; choice (Child, 1972) ; complexity (Galbraith, 1973) ; unpredictability (Cyert and March, 1963) ; and turbulence (Emery and Trist, 1965) . Thompson (1967) , in his classic book, Organizations in Action, notes that uncertainty is a fundamental problem in complex organizations and that coping with uncertainty is the essence of administrative process. Under uncertainty, two factors may influence the direction of players' action, and produce more free riders. First, in terms of time perspective, if actors put the stress on short-sighted and uncertain vision for returns on investment, not long-term payoff structure, they are, within the short term, much more likely to seek their own interests than collective ones. As a result, the greater the uncertainty about outcomes, the lower the likelihood of cooperation (Chen et al., 1996) . Second, concerned with the subjective side of players, the low probability is related with lack of information on objective facts about future or collaborators facilitates the opportunistic behaviors and winds up with undesirable results. Research consortia may aid in the formation of an industry-wide vision of future directions for technological innovation, but such consensus views are not always reliable, especially when technologies are relatively immature and the directions of their future development are highly uncertain. Such visions can be overtaken by unexpected scientific or technological developments (Mowery, 1998) . Corresponding to research goals, we presume that government is the crucial variable to determine the project success by holding down the uncertainty stemming from not only objective conditions, i.e. the lack of technology information, but also subjective ones, i.e. too low probability about future technology innovation.
Against uncertainty, two policy alternatives are recommended:
(1) assuring the long-term and certain vision against uncertainty; (2) providing sufficient information.
These solutions closely connect with expectation of actors who request selfinterests. McCabe et al. (1998) Second, concerned with unacceptable payoff structure, it comes down to matters of benefit and cost attributed to participators. No rational actors will carry the imposed cost for collective goals unless two conditions are met:
(1) the anticipated benefits from participation exceed the benefits achieved through free riding; and (2) the benefits exceed the participation costs.
Moreover, as public goods are, in nature, nonexclusive and noncompetitive, the marginal benefits of some actors from the collective good would not usually compensate for their full cost of taking part. When emerging n-person prisoners' dilemma happens, actors have their own individual incentives not to cooperate in collective action, even if it would be collectively profitable. Olson's selective incentive is also related with the benefit and cost structure. If there are unwarranted and low payoff, low defection cost, and high burden cost, the collaborators want to remaine free riders. Chong (1991) argues that the cooperation is motivated not only by selective material incentives but by various positive and negative social sanctions which include moral concerns, let alone expressive or intrinsic benefits from participation itself. Taylor and Singleton (1993) argue that transaction costs ± including searching costs, bargaining costs, monitoring costs and enforcement costs ± impeding collective actions would be lowered by the presence of community which is characterized by shared beliefs, stable relations, and multiple relationships. While large JVs are likely to generate the economies of scope and scale that comes from the number of participators, the larger participators need a great cost in monitoring the JVs. Viewing from government's role, public laboratory participation can reduce the monitoring cost for the JVs (Leyden and Link, 1999) . All matters come down to government's leverage balancing cost and benefit from collaborative action, and moreover maximizing benefits and minimizing costs through adjusting payoff matrix. Chiang (1995) suggests that there are at least two nonexclusive generic strategies that can be used to deal with prisoners' dilemma in JVs Based on those propositions, we analyze the CDMA technology projects as collaborative enterprises in which government takes responsibility to eliminate the unwanted outcomes from selfish collaborators and furthermore extend the merit of collaborative R&D project. We could identify the cooperation conditions and policy tools provided by governments.
Case description: CDMA technology development process Case selection and actors
We choose CDMA project as a subjected case. First, the project of CDMA technology is a good example standing for technology innovation through JVs in which, to induce the technology innovation, government and private enterprises cooperated with each other. Second, as CDMA project is not a static case but dynamic one, we therefore could induce the implications about evolutionary strategies of government in collaborative R&D. Third, in CDMA projects, we observed the opportunistic or free-riding action of private firms. Fourth, CDMA projects resulted in the success of cooperation by means of the adequate role division and coordination in which government plays a decisive role.
About participators in CDMA projects, the focused actors in public sector included the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) (former Ministry of Postal Service), consisting of ministers and bureaucrats and the Electronic and Telecommunication Research Institute (ETRI). In the private circle, manufactures and service providers related to the CDMA project included LG Electronics, Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Electronics, Motorola, SK Telecom (former Korea Mobile Telecommunication, KMT), Shinsegi Telecom, LG Telecom, Korea Telecommunication (KT), Hansol PCS, and QUALCOMM. For the CDMA projects, the Government officially designated LG, Samsung, Hyundai, and Motorola as manufactures, and SK Telecom, Shinsegi, KT, LG Telecom, Hansol PCS as service providers based on CDMA technology, and QUALCOMM as foreign partner for technology transfers. We include the service providers in analysis units because the success of technology innovation depends on marketization of developed products, not only innovation of product and process per se.
Innovation process of CDMA technology
The focused research period bearing on CDMA projects started from 1989 and ended in 1998. The whole process divides into three phase; pre-development phase (from 1989 to 1993), developing phase (from 1992 to 1995), and postdevelopment phase (from 1996 to 1998). Each period might overlap because we can divide developing period into three parts according to consequent events along with process of technology innovation, not time order. Usually at the predevelopment phase, developers consider the possibility of technology development and then set more visible goals and developmental schedules. Entering into the developing stage, innovators make an effort to develop the product and facilitate the process innovation. At final stage, the developed goods enter into market in which the technology innovation is evaluated by market criteria. According to three phases, the history of CDMA project would be specified by Table I . This situation also applied to Korea's telecommunication market. Albeit the mobile tele-service began in 1984 by the analog system and the demand on it appeared sharply growing, service providers had faced the lacked spectrum to accommodate the increasing subscribers, and poor communication quality. Despite the striding growth of demand on mobile service all the systems and components installed into mobile system were imported. The import substitution and domestication rates of these products were very low.
Responding to this demand, the Government promoted the development of digital telecommunication system, CDMA. At the suggestion on collaborative CDMA development plan by the Government, the private enterprises showed a reluctant response because they didn't confide in the success of technology development and the commercialization of CDMA products. Even Daewoo who had accumulated the technology and knowledge on mobile systems through related research didn't want to jump into the CDMA projects. Samsung that originally set up the plan of market exploitation by time division multiple access (TDMA) contrasted with CDMA also displayed passive moves to accept the technology mode of CDMA.
As several objective conditions didn't satisfy the need of private developers, myopic private firms justly denied the role of collaborators and wanted to be free-riding imitators to innovation. Viewing this project from certainty, there is no long vision or information for technology innovation and marketization of CDMA technology. CDMA, one of the high technologies, involved the risks as following:
. the need for enormous development efforts and cost;
. the potentiality of freezing the latest model;
. the high uncertainty in information and knowledge from unknown technologies;
. the inferior position in standard competition to TDMA; and . the low possibility of marketization.
Because of novelty of CDMA technologies, the weakness in technology consistence and the incompleteness in technology function was also pointed out. Moreover our technology and science on digital code, compared to the foreign technologies, had been poorly underdeveloped and just imitated the foreign technology. Although the broad band technology was the basic core to constitute CDMA systems, we didn't have even basic knowledge about it. All the technology knowledge including the interpretation, prediction capacity, core function, and design for network and circuit showed poor state. This vulnerable BIJ 8,3
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technology base for CDMA technology therefore bestowed the uncertainty and low probability on private collaborators and made the innovation doubtable.
Furthermore, new technology innovations need not only a great amount of investment of capital and human forces but also long-term perspectives from collaborators. Concerned with the latter, firms have a tendency to prefer shortsighted and guaranteed returns since the market fluctuation and instability distort the value and trajectory of developed technologies. But the CDMA technology newly invented didn't possess the long vision for market dominance. Equally, there were inherent constraints for the commercialization of CDMA technology because it was hard to catch up with the leading technology, TDMA that had already launched its service and nearly dominated the world telecommunication market. De facto standardized TDMA technology dominated the world market so that even if we were supposed to develop CDMA project, the possibility of successfully commercializing it was predicted too low. Unwarranted and low payoff from future market forbade the private firms to get into the joint ventures. Moreover, when the CDMA projects as one of larger projects required the developers to take on the burden of much financing budget and cost, they were too considerate to plunge into the venture. In short, no long vision and information, unwarranted and low payoff, and high burden cost from CDMA technology brought out passive attitude of private firms toward collaborative projects and made them remain free riders or imitators, just following the technology initiators.
Developing phase: passive and opportunistic behaviors. At the developing stage of CDMA projects, although collaborative development venture was launched, there were three unintended problems which facilitated the noncooperation and reinforced the passive attitude of private collaborators.
First, although the final goals had determined to develop the CDMA mode, not TDMA, the specific goals for technology development yet remained stayed ambiguous, which exacerbated the unstable development process. Also, on the matter of technology, the fragmented knowledge about CDMA system between collaborators affected the effective developing progresses. The reluctant attitude of QUALCOMM for technology transfer retarded the pace of technology developing progress. In short, an unspecific goal about technology development and imperfect information about CDMA technology delayed overall development progress of CDMA projects and motivated the participators to loaf.
Second, the environment and management for CDMA projects were not adequate to stimulate the participators because there were no incentive systems including the positive and negative punishment against passive attitude of collaborators to technology development. Low cost for defection and laziness derived the opportunistic or free-riding action and fostered a noncompetitive mood around the development community, which greatly dragged the development pace.
Post-development phase: resistance against marketization of developed CDMA. Today, as commercialization of developed products becomes much Benchmarking government's roles 201 more crucial for the success of technology innovation, consequently research on collaborative technology innovation puts much more stress more on commercialization than technology development itself. There were two problems pertinent to commercialization of CDMA technologies. In the process of CDMA project, policy-makers faced the resistance from private companies: Shinsegi and KT as technology consumers and service providers of CDMA. Denying the roles of technology consumers obfuscated the market prospects for CDMA, which disturbs all technology suppliers and providers. Shinsegi was officially appointed as the second service provider for mobile telecommunication on condition that CDMA technology had to be used in business. But Shinsegi rejected the CDMA standard and technologies suggested by the Government.
When Shinsegi as a consumer denied the required role from governments, such response was attributed to rational and calculated reasons from its own interests. Above all, as it should compete with KMT which had already provided the service and dominated the mobile service market, Shinsegi wanted stable systems, based on analog mode, for the convenience of clients and for racing with KMT. As the systems based on CDMA device hadn't confirmed its service quality and also showed the instability at system operation, Shinsegi requested the analog mode for the purpose of service provisions instead of CDMA systems. Furthermore the foreign companies, Air Touch Co. and Southwest Ten Bell, which had stock in Shinsegi, had operated pressure on the Korean Government through United State Trade Representatives to accept the demand from Shinsegi.
In the case of KT, the reason to resist can be divided into two. First as KT, competing with SK, was worried about market encroachment by SK, it wanted the stable and profitable technology of TDMA by which KT could dominate the market for the mobile service. Also as service charges using TDMA devices were cheap, it could easily attract the consumers. In addition, to enter into foreign market and export the technology, it was the best policy to adopt TDMA mode because this technology already formed a stable market around the world, which had occupied 80 percent of the market for mobile telecommunication in the USA. However, CDMA technology had not completed the development of all the systems and had been estimated taking more two or three years to commence the commercial service. The resistance from technology demander unstabilized the CDMA projects and shook the technology development regimes. Two companies' resistance is closely connected with their payoff-structure and uncertainty over particular future market dominance; CDMA technology newly developed didn't guarantee the same profits and returns as did TDMA, a dominant technology in the market.
Government's roles for cooperation
Government's roles against uncertainty. In collaborative project, considerable management strategies will be focused on exterminating shortcomings of this mode and extending its merit. Management is the technique of intelligently BIJ 8,3
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dealing with uncertainty and risk. Uncertainty stemming from short-sighted vision and imperfect information about CDMA technology drove free-riders' motivation. As suggested by Proposition 1, in collaborative technology innovation, government could overcome the collective action problems by securing long-term and certain vision, and providing the sufficient information.
In the CDMA projects, the Government tried to reduce the uncertainty by both suggesting the long plans and visions for CDMA project and setting specific goals for technology development. As technology vector means comparatively weighing on specific direction of devoted efforts and developmental methods, to determine the vector is closely related with goal setting and long-term planning.
At initial stage, first, when anything couldn't guarantee the successful achievement of the CDMA project, the Government aggressively selected the CDMA technology as the unitary national standard. It functioned as evidences notifying Government's adamant vision over uncertain technology. At initial stage of technology development, the main actors in public sector included MIC and ETRI. MIC enacted energetically the technology trajectory of national standard for mobile telecommunication, which took effects as a long vision to hold down short-sighted behavior of private actors, whereas ETRI played the role of legitimating the CDMA technology by addressing the specific technology items and providing the private co-developers with technology information.
ETRI's research plans prescribed in detail the specified development schedules from the launch of digital system development to the end of commercialization stage. The content of these plans included:
. the development of technological standard of digital mobile telecommunication;
. the enactment of system standard;
. developing base station and a mobile station;
. developing a mobile switching center; and . the constitution of cellular network technology.
Accordingly the meticulous and consistent planning and goal setting over CDMA project by the Government resulted into concrete foundations securing long-term stability. Furthermore, the long-term plans were effective criteria which at once directed and delegated the mission. Table II shows well-defined plan and its results of CDMA development set up by ETRI from 1989 to 1998.
From Table II , as we know that enacting the technology developing path moves forward, not backward and reverse direction, the developing trajectory of each system follows the compartmentalized order as those;
(1) researching into basic demand and technology; to (2) analyzing and designing systems; to (3) developing the core technology; to Benchmarking government's roles 
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(4) testing the commercialized systems; to (5) complementing and elaborating systems; to (6) forwardly supporting on service operation.
Such planned progress may reflect the rational strategies of technology management. Generally speaking, the goal gives the project direction and criteria to evaluate the program. In the CDMA project, the Government as a manager actively used the goal to measure the performance and, if it found something wrong, redirected the program. The flexible goal setting allowed the developers to possess more clear directions and vision. In the CDMA project, one of the remarkable goal managements was moving target strategies which meant the redirecting and resetting of the goals according to situation and technology changes. For example, ETRI, invented CMS-1, but it was not well matched with our indigenous technologies and telecommunication environments, which was apt to produce the inconsistency between systems and decrease the function quality. ETRI thereupon rescheduled the development plan and set the plan to make the indigenous systems, KCS-2 (=CMS-2) to match with our technology environments. Moreover, in case of resetting the already-decided-goals, collaborators delivered the program review meeting through which the actors discussed and coordinated the plan for technology development and got a clear vision and specific goals for the CDMA project. In relation to the foreign partner, QUALCOMM, the planned workflow was also adopted. Contracting with QUALCOMM, the ETRI appended the statements of work that functioned as time table regulating work procedure and pace. The changed items were to be reflected in the joint development agreement between the ETRI and QUALCOMM. Second, the information about technology and other players' move can change and increase the probability against uncertainty. The information effect can be described by learning model assuming that the additional information changes a player's reference point. At that time adopting the CDMA system as national standard, our Governments already accumulated some of the required knowledge related to CDMA through experience of a digital project which had begun in 1989 and through CDMA research implemented by department of defense for the purpose of military usage. Further, other parallel experiences having developed the leading technology including TDX and DRAM projects by collaborators helped the policy-makers and technocrats to decide the policy for the CDMA project.
In time perspective, after ETRI had developed and tested the basic system by using accumulated knowledge, it transferred the technology information to the private enterprises. In addition, ETRI had already chosen CDMA technology as the national project in 1989 before the CDMA project fully got down to work in 1992. On that fact, we recognized that such accumulated and transferred knowledge gave a great deal of incentive to private collaborators to participate in the CDMA project.
To accumulate the technology information, ETRI made an effort to develop and domesticate the mobile technology and then transferred these technologies to private collaborators. One of distinctive activities performed by ERTI was the domestication of foreign technology and science. For example, ETRI had developed and enacted Korea Cellular System (KCS-1) as system standard through referring on the technologies offered by QUALCOMM in May 1993. But as KCS-1 didn't offer the fundamental knowledge and also increased the risk, it couldn't satisfy the requirement for commercialization. To solve that problem, ETRI decided to begin the research over KCS-2 which was appropriately designed products for domestication.
In the JV with private enterprises, the Government changed private collaborators' attitude and induced cooperation by assuring the long-term and certain visions and providing the sufficient information. Concerned with policy tools, the Government in the CDMA innovation process gave the enterprises technology information and addressed the goal and vision for future development process.
Government's roles against poor payoff structure. In Proposition 2, we argued that if governments were to warrant and raise the payoff, to hold up the defection cost, and to lower the burden cost, it could decrease the opportunistic behaviors of private participators.
First, related with unwarranted payoff and low expected returns from the CDMA project, the Government took strategies to assure and raise the benefit of private firms by means of: BIJ 8,3
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. standard determination;
. designation of technology suppliers and consumers; and . supporting the market expansion.
Considering that the analog-based system would come to overcapacity, MIC planned the development of digital mobile telecommunication system. For that purpose, MIC chose the CDMA system as the national standard, which meant selecting one linear developmental path, excluding other alternatives. The unitary standard selection compared to the multiple one had some advantages of coercion and compulsion, by which the Government showed the adamant position convincing private actors who were uncertain about the CDMA project. Moreover, choosing CDMA as a national standard signaled the private manufactures to get in CDMA projects in that at least they could seize the domestic mobile market i.e. certain determined profits by unitary standard. Unitary standard took effect because it could be considered as the monopolic interests which stimulated the private enterprise to take actions for the CDMA projects.
In domestic part, the Government planned to connect the CDMA technology with decision on the entry of new mobile service providers (the technology consumers of CDMA). The private companies which had wanted to start their mobile services had to accept the CDMA standard as service product, by which Korea became the first country to commercialize CDMA technology and set CDMA as a national standard. Considering other countries that usually adopt the plural technology standards, not single, our policy orientation took a risk promoting the linear technology trajectory, but took effect in confiding with the suspicious private firms and guaranteeing profits to them.
Technology innovation is the object-oriented activity to give the novelty, consisting of two kinds of steps: technology innovation (i.e. consisting of product innovation and process innovation) and marketizaiton. Consequently, the management of technology innovation must predict and prepare for the market acceptance and profits of the innovated products. Even if the quality and distinctiveness of invented goods were to be highly appreciated, the consumer would reject the product. The market has its own logic like the economic efficiency and consumer's satisfaction. The project manager therefore has constantly devised the specific inventories to dominate the unpredictable market. Under the CDMA projects, the Government reduced the uncertainty from market by setting a mobile standard. Furthermore, selecting for co-developers shaped the environment to propel the project. Officially selecting Samsung, Hyundai and LG as the manufactures and collaborators functioned as giving the economic rent which rendered the appointees to enjoy the surplus profits.
For the sake of increase of profitability from CDMA technology in the market, although the technology innovation had finished the project in 1998, the Government continued the policy support to enhance the market value and expand abroad the market of invented CDMA. To this end, on May 25, 1997, Benchmarking government's roles
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MIC announced the investment about the 220 billion for four years to develop and elaborate the core components of CDMA technology. Furthermore, to expand the domestic or international market for CDMA product, Government's efforts appeared across the boundary of related government departments. To expand the foreign market, all of the government departments including MIC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy made their own best effort. Second, to check the individual defection from collaborative projects, the Government imposed both the high defection cost as a stick and relieved, as a carrot, the burden that was attributed to private collaborators.
The Government forbade the private firm to deviate from the projects by increasing the cost of defection. Selfish firms would be likely to behave more opportunistically when the risk of retaliation against defection and shirking is low. To the resistance from Shinsegi and KT, the Government made use of ambivalent strategies. Corresponding to Shinsegi's reluctance to accept CDMA mode, the MIC announced officially:
. . . if Shinsegi promotes the business with analog mode, not CDMA, Government will cancel the license on mobile telecom service scheduled to launch at January 1996.
The possibility of retrieving the business right for mobile service effectively worked as heightening the cost from defection. After all Shinsegi came to decide the service delivery with mode of CDMA. Such Government measures were also administered to the case of KT and also took effect. Tripsasa et al. (1995) argued that Government could play a role in discouraging opportunistic behavior through an ability to threaten by reprisal to discipline or exclude noncompliant firms. In the CDMA case, the Government also wielded such a strong threatening stick.
On the other hand, the Government also gave private collaborators the carrot, not only a stick, to appease the untamed ones. When KMT, a rival of Shinsegi, asked MIC to allow additional allocation on service spectrum to prepare the expected increase of subscribers, Government rejected this proposal to deliberate the response of Shinsegi. Bornstein et al. (1993) demonstrated that, in light of a new approach to gametheoretic equilibrium solutions, the competition between groups could reduce free riding in an experimental prisoner dilemma game. Furthermore, Government structured the competition among private actors by exercising relevant negative incentives like penalty against laziness and defection in the process of technology development. ETRI fostered the competitive environment among cooperators by means of the procurement plan ± a kind of profitable returns ± which was bounded to confer the supply right to whom firstly achieved the target goal; first come, first served. The private partners must meet the technological demand specification from the Government so that it was operated as the obligatory coercion mechanisms to curb the resistance from private collaborators. Those strategies worked as negative and positive stimuli at once.
To reduce the high burden cost shouldered by actors, the Government mobilized the financial recourses as well as the technology information. The commercialization of CDMA project is a good example that shows success of policy integrating the industrial policy with technology policy; the first gives the emphasis on the demand side policy including subsidy, tax credit and tariff barrier, whereas the second is related to technology transfer and products commercialization. In the CDMA projects, the Government supported the private firm by utilizing the various funds and subsidies, by enlarging the export insurance, and by discounting the insurance rate.
As the collaboration can alleviate the burden taken by collaborators, consequently, industrial economics considers the cooperation as a means to share costs. Under limited budgets, the cooperation is efficient for the consortium as a whole, although it may not be optimal for the individual firms (Aloysius, 1999) . Those implications were effectuated in the CDMA projects. For exploiting the CDMA technology, the Government, manufacturers and service providers had invested each W530, W218 and W235 billion, summing up W996 billion, from 1989 to 1996. In private section, LG, SAMSUNG, and HYUNDAI had input each W282, W284 and W429 billion with total W967 billion into this project. The number of staff participating in the project came to 1,433, as shown in Table III. In short, for cooperation in the jointed technology venture for CDMA, against poor compensation structure, the Government was to warrant and raise the payoff, to make defection cost higher, and to lower the burden cost. For that purpose, the Government used policies tools and strategies to assure the benefits from collaboration like allowing the market share, endowing the economic rent, imposing the high defection cost by using license authority, structuring the productive competition among rivals, and relieving the monetary burden by financial support and cost sharing.
Conclusion
As the collaborative technology innovations may well be accepted as one of the primary tools for technology innovation, governments participate in the joint ventures and moreover do something to control the unwanted and unexpected results by meticulous planning and coordination.
In case of the collaborative development, the Government can play the different and various roles varying from developmental systems. After regarding the collaborative project of the CDMA as a collective enterprise having risk of cooperation collapse by private firms (i.e. opportunists or free riders to maximize their profits), this paper focuses on finding out the conditions for cooperation and government's roles as a third party to induce the cooperation. We established two propositions based on the theories of CA and PD:
(1) In joint venture, a government could overcome the free-riding or passive position of private firms by securing long-term and certain vision, and providing sufficient information. (2) If a government is able to warrant and raise payoff, to make the defection cost higher, and to lower burden cost, it will decrease the opportunistic behaviors by private participators.
Based on these theoretical hypotheses, we tried to analyze the case of the CDMA technology development process led by the Korean Government and induce more realistic and integrated conditions for cooperation and government's roles and policy tools in JV. Throughout the analysis on these innovation processes of CDMA, first we could identify the usefulness of our propositions about the conditions for cooperation and government's roles. Second, we find out the specific policy tools to secure the conditions for cooperation:
. against uncertainty, long-term planning and vision, specific goal setting, and provision of technology information took effect;
. against poor payoff structure, the Government ensured market share for private collaborators through endowing the economic rent by setting the national technology standard, by appointing the suppliers and consumers of CDMA, and by supporting the market expansion. Also, the Government prevented the shirking actions by imposing the high defection cost through using the license authority and structuring the competition among rivals, and by relieving the burden through financial support and cost sharing.
We have showed effective Government strategies for project management to induce the cooperation. As the several implications draw from CDMA projects could provide the useful guidance to project managers in next technology projects. First, in collaborative venture, the inherent problems are related with free-riding problems and such opportunistic behaviors could lead to the cooperation failure. As this tragedy for collective welfare might be expected, the Government could control the undesirable results by deliberate strategies. In the process of CDMA project, the Government was responsible for role as the guardian for cooperative conditions. Second, research on the CDMA projects significantly revealed the Government's role and effective policy tools in which the most effective mechanism to oppress the opportunistic behaviors by private actors was concerned with their micro-motivation e.g. maximizing their individual profits. Thus, before implementing the policy strategies, policy makers should consider the micro internal motives of private firms and then utilize strategically the policy tools to activate or restrain them. Those policy tools for regulating the vice of private firms and facilitating the virtue of them include the carrot and stick such as monetary support, technology transfer, and retrieving of licensed business right. In the case that the necessary conditions and roles provided by government satisfy the needs of private firms seeking their own interests, the tools appeared more productive and acceptable. Those roles imply a Government's position in the forthcoming governance age, as not authoritarian. Third as organizational environment constantly changes, the strategies used by a Government should be dynamically varied from the development phases and environment changes. The various strategies should appropriately be used in accordance with situational and structural changes and that will reduce the uncertainty coming from turbulent environments. The policy tools and tactics which appeared in the CDMA projects are good examples of a government exerting its power with effectiveness in technology innovation.
Notes
1. Collaborative R&D projects by each countries constitute those following; Korea (TDX-10, G7 Project, semi-conductor memory chip project, 4M, 16M, and 64M DRAM projects), Europe (EUREKA, ESPRIT, CERN, COST, DELTA projects), Japan (VLSI, the fifth generation computer development project, Multi-Core Project, five dimension computer project, intelligence production system, and international collaborative research programs), US (SEMATEC, VHSIC, ATP (Advanced Technology Program), Manufacturing Technology Center.
2. Code division multiple access, as a digital mobile communication, was first developed in 1960s for military communication and was adopted in 1993 as a US mobile communication standard. CDMA, unlike time division multiple access, makes clear communication possible for different users at the same time, not at different time, by spreading the occupied frequency band to a broader spectrum, by assigning a unique code to each call, and by transmitting digitized data (voice and signal) along with the unique identification code. Thus CDMA has approximately 9-15 times larger capacity than the conventional analog system and accommodates 3-5 times more users than TDMA by utilizing frequencies in a highly efficient manner. CDMA reduces call drops with the application of soft hand-off technology and is equipped with wideband signal processing capabilities by which it could guarantee the communication privacy. Service system by CDMA can offer a wide range of enhanced services and deliver high-speed data transmission service, compared with TDMA (ETRI, 1999).
3. Nonrivalry consumption occurs where A's partaking of the consumption benefits does not reduce the benefits derived by all others. The same benefits are available to all and without mutual interference. Nonexcludability appears where the people consumed the products regardless of paying (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984) .
